The Seward Park
Bridge
From
1920 until 1937 there were numerous proposals to build a bridge from Seward Park
to Mercer Island. But the proposal was “so controversial that
for many years it was little more than conversation.” That assessment is straight out of a post
World War II promotional pamphlet from Puget Sound Bridge and Dredging
(PSB&D), the same company that struggled to cobble together a “joint”
City-County franchise in 1930 and a year later gained City Council approval for
a “feedway” through the Park for the bridge, although
any construction of Seward Park Way was encumbered by the possibility of the shorelands reverting back to the State of Washington under
a 1913 law. The person who could have
best told the story was a wonderful writer, Horace W. McCurdy, an engineer,
President of PSB&D, and resident of Mount Baker Park. As President of PSB&D and head of the
joint venture which built the Lake Washington
floating bridge, he gave that project much of his “personal attention.” Under his watch PSB&D was the second
largest employer in Seattle
during World War II. Later on he served
as President of the Museum of History and Industry (MOHAI) for two years, made
major contributions to MOHAI, and was honored by having the land where MOHAI is
located named H. W. McCurdy Park.
Although Mac was at least a Vice-President of PSB&D one year after
the Company first applied for a franchise for the Seward
Park – Mercer Island bridge in 1927 and became President
a few years later, there is not one word about the SP-MI bridge
in the two volumes of Don’t Leave Any Holidays, McCurdy’s autobiography.
In
1937 Mac suffered a nervous breakdown partially brought on by the stress of
running a business during the Great Depression. But who can doubt that the Seward Park
bridge, that briefest of all alternatives, which was never to be more than a
lengthy series of problems and controversies, must have weighed heavily on McCurdy? There were numerous objections over the
PSB&D franchise. The initial idea of
a mud or railroad fill inspired fierce opposition. The concept of a privately owned and operated
toll bridge stuck in the craw of many in Seattle who favored municipal
ownership. Many who lamented the
haphazard growth of Seattle’s street car lines
as they stretched to reach one or another real estate development thought of
the bridge to Mercer Island
as another attempt to enrich land speculators.
Indeed, A. C. Frost, owner and developer of the Uplands declared in a
telegram to the Seattle Times, “The demand for a toll bridge is artificial…Seward Park
is the heritage of future generations which must not be despoiled by the greed
of private corporations.” But for the
Uplands, that district “for architects and fellow kindred professionals”
adjacent to Seward Park, Frost sought a 50-year concession for a yacht club in
Seward Park in 1927 and was still angling to buy a southern portion of the Park
for one in 1938. With the red hot
controversy splashed in newspaper headlines vanishing by late 1931, A. C. Frost
was not the only player in the controversy who was seemingly able to juggle
with impunity such glaring inconsistencies.
The motives of both promoter and opponents seemed to lose clarity in the
increasingly musky waters of Lake Washington.
Such
is H. W. McCurdy. Ralph Bushnell Potts
in Seattle Heritage argues that “Puget Sound Bridge
and Dredging Company was not inclined to push the scheme” i.e. the bridge, due
to the opposition of Clarence Blethen of the Seattle
Times and the “deepening depression.” Blethen and a succession of Park
Board Presidents – George Stirrat, A. S. Kerry, and
especially Simon Burnett – adamantly objected to the bridge because of is
impact on Seward Park.
The Seattle Times warned against the “defacement of one of its finest
parks.” Simon Burnett argued for Seward Park
as “one of the last few remaining refuges for those on foot,” and defended the Park forest to the last tree:
If any of the trees are taken away
the environment of those in the ranks behind would be changed and they would gradually
die out. Then the next and the next,
until finally the greatest asset of the city of Seattle would cease to be great and would
become just another park, just another piece of land.
Unlike many bridge proponents, Mac
never seemed to be under the thrall of our “modern chariot”, the automobile. Don’t Leave Any Holidays is full of
pictures and descriptions of boats and dredges and racing shells and even
pontoons for bridges, but the car is largely conspicuous by is absence. Gordon Newell writes of McCurdy’s father
passing on his “almost mystic love of the Northwest frontier,” which included
its “brooding forests”. McCurdy used the
occasion of the near completion of the 14th Avenue South Bridge in
early 1931 to laud PSB&D’s ability to “successfully overcome many natural obstacles
in constructing for Seattle…bridges.” McCurdy never had occasion to use such
language in describing the SP-MI Bridge, perhaps because he shared some of the
sentiment of those fighting to preserve Seward Park’s
“natural obstacles”.
McCurdy,
in terms of promoting PSB&D and its role in construction of the SP-MI bridge, probably made a huge misstep in early 1931. Mac, possibly at the behest of his “friend
and shipmate” Charles Clise, was pressed into serving
as a leader of the “Committee of 59” set up to defeat the recall of Mayor and
bridge supporter Frank Edwards. The
Mayor had fired J. D. Ross, the Superintendent of Seattle City Light. The firing alarmed the Citizens Municipal
Utilities Protection League and it officers, Mary Zioncheck
and Frank Fitts, which then ran a campaign to recall
the Mayor. Edwards insisted in one of a
number of speeches on KJR that “communism is the root of the present
trouble.” The Mayor lost the election
and Ross was immediately reinstated as Superintendent. In the Depression-wasted capital markets,
Ross walked off after a journey back east with private financing for City Light
projects. PSB&D, despite frequent
assertions that the bridge was on the verge of “getting underway,” never raised
enough money to amount to anything.
Moreover, beginning with the 1932 elections, a sea change in politics
took place with the election of Roosevelt, placing people in power like Frank Fitts in the City Council and Marion Zioncheck
in the U. S, Congress who had little reason to look kindly on H. W.
McCurdy. By 1935, under the leadership
of John W, “Radiospeaker” Stevenson, Chairman of the
Board of County
Commissioners, the SP-MI bridge became a County project with PBS&D
remaining as the “consulting, designing, and supervising engineer” for the
bridge. There is nothing to indicate
that Marion Zioncheck was of any help procuring the
sought-after federal funds, which in any event failed to materialize as Roosevelt decided to fund the WPA at the expense of the
PWA. State Director of Highways Lacy V.
Murrow stepped into the muddle after 1937, and with the help of Homer M. Hadley
and Miller Freeman revived the old notion of developing what was to become the Mercer Island floating bridge as the most logical part of
the route over the Snoqualmie
Pass. Thus the Day Street Tunnel, which would serve
as the central cross-lake ferry terminal in Virgil Bogue’s
1910 Plan of Seattle, now launched a bridge, completed on July 2, 1940.
The
description by D. W. Stuver, Vice-President of
PSB&D, of the SP-MI bridge “as being in the nature
of a local proposition,” was sufficient to produce an astonishing amount of
effort that went nowhere. McCurdy liked
to say that “a job which started bad finished bad.” The first effort to build a cross-lake bridge
was an attempt by residents of South Mercer Island in 1922 to purchase 15
surplus World War I wooden freighters as pontoons to help bridge the 3000 feet
from Seward Park to Mercer Island, and foundered partly because the County declared
“it would not be made useful enough to justify the expense, and it would not be
centrally located.” Moreover, the
members of the Mercer Island Community Club interjected that the “piling
approach which it is proposed to build at Seward Park…would
spoil the Park to a considerable degree.”
Thus by 1922, not only were formidable objections raised publicly
against the Seward Park Bridge, almost ensuring a bad start for the project,
but the objections suggested the possibility that the SP-MI bridge was simply a
bad job which should have been shelved.